This article reconstructs Nietzsche's shifting views on democracy in the period 1870–86 with reference to his enduring preoccupation with tyrannical concentrations of power and the conviction that radical pluralism offers the only effective form of resistance. As long as he identifies democracy with pluralism , he sympathizes with it as a site of resistance and emancipation. From around 1880 on, however, Nietzsche increasingly links it with tyranny, in the form of popular sovereignty, and with the promotion of uniformity, to the (...) exclusion of genuine pluralism. Democracy's emancipatory claims are reinterpreted as "misarchism," or hatred of authority, and Nietzsche looks to the "exceptional beings" excluded by democracy for sources of resistance to the "autonomous herd" and "mob rule." Against elitist readings of this move, it is argued that Nietzsche opposes the domination of the herd type under democracy from a standpoint in human diversity and a generic concern with the future of humankind. Exceptional individuals are conceived in pluralistic, agonal terms, as a community of legislators engaged in a process of transvaluation that serves the interests not of one or a few but of all of us: "the self-overcoming of the human.". (shrink)

This paper examines Nietzsche's attitude to the empirical by concentrating on his concept of Empfindung (sensation, perception, feeling). In Section 1, five distinctive features of his use of 'Empfindung' are described in relation to the philosophical tradition and some of his sources in 19 th Century physiology. All five features, I argue, point to Nietzsche's philosophical concern to stake out the limits of 'Empfindung' as an aspect of human finitude. In Section 2, my attention turns from the term 'Empfindung' to (...) Nietzsche's actual argumentation. The bewildering variety of perspectives and arguments concerning 'Empfindung' in his writings are broken down into three basic types of argument or discourse with radically different, incompatible presuppositions: a critical, epistemological discourse serving anti-metaphysical ends; a quasiscientific discourse serving critical-epistemological ends; and a quasi-ontological discourse of life that looks to explain the results of Nietzsche's critical epistemology. The value of this 'contradictory' practice, I contend, is twofold: Nietzsche makes epistemology fruitful for the philosophical problem of life; at the same time he offers a performative critique of epistemology by the manner in which he exceeds it. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 25(2) 2006: 146-158. (shrink)

The question posed in this paper concerns destruction: What part, if any, does destruction play in Nietzsche's life-project of critical transvaluation? Nietzsche's project, I argue, involves a total critique of Western values in the name of life, yet this does not entail total violence: the destruction of antagonistic values. Violent, destructive impulses cannot be subtracted from his thought; the question is whether they make for destruction as the goal of critique (I). Nietzsche's reflections on „critical history” are used to show (...) his awareness of a recoiling logic of self-destruction threatening any act of critical destruction. On this basis, I argue that Nietzsche seeks a „limit in the negation of the past” (II) and propose an „agonal” model of critique that incorporates such a limit: Nietzschean critique is regulated by a regime of reciprocal empowerment—disempowerment, based on the central institution of Homeric culture, the agon or contest. The agonal regime allows for the total critique of values, while arresting the logic of self-destruction through a code of limited violence; „agonal mastery” displaces destruction as the goal of critique. In support of this thesis, Nietzsche's own account of his war-praxis from Ecce Homo is examined with emphasis on the moments of limitation (III). His account of the agon in Homeric Greek culture is then examined as a model for critique that embodies his declared war-praxis (IV). In the final section (V), the agonal pathos of envy is used to explicate the dynamic of agonal critique as an alternative to total warfare and to flesh out the concept of mastery that separates the two. (shrink)